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were entitled to assume the boat they
rented was free from defects. Accordingly, the majority affirmed the district
court's holding that the Diplomat was
strictly liable for injuries to Mrs.
Amoroso resulting from defects in a
sailboat she rented from Atlantic. Thus,
the Florida Supreme Court extended the
application of strict liability to commercial lease transactions, subject to
the limitations set forth in the opinion.
Dissenting justices question strict
liability
Justices McDonald and Overton concurred in part and dissented in part with
the majority's opinion. The justices concurred with the majority's decision insofar as it held the Diplomat liable under the theories of implied warranty of
fitness and negligence, but disagreed
with the application of strict liability to
the Diplomat. They contended that strict
liability should not apply to the Diplomat because the sailboat rental business
was only an incidental part of the hotel's
business. Furthermore, the two justices
felt that the majority's application of
strict liability to the Diplomat was unnecessary because the theories of implied warranty of fitness and negligence
provide adequate protection to the public in such cases.
-Christy Thouvenot

Mailing, not receipt,
determines refund
time limitations
In Rosser v. United States, 9 F.2d
1519 (1 lth Cir. 1993), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11 th Circuit held that
the statute of limitations for a tax refund
claim expires two years from the mailing of a disallowance notice. Reversing
the district court, the 11th Circuit declared the plain language of 26 U.S.C.
§6532(a)(1) to mean that the statute of
128

limitations for an income tax dispute
runs from the date a disallowance notice is mailed, regardless of whether the
taxpayer actually receives such notice.
The court further maintained that a second disallowance notice does not equitably estop the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from asserting the statute of
limitations as a bar to a taxpayer's recovery.
Taxpayer Claims Refunds for
Charity Deductions
Robert G. Rosser's federal income
tax returns for the years 1979 through
1982 claimed charitable deductions for
art objects he donated to the Birmingham Museum of Art. The IRS disallowed portions of those charitable deductions and, therefore, found deficiencies in Rosser's tax liability for those
years. On April 5, 1985, Rosser paid his
deficiencies for 1979, 1980, and 1981.
On December 30, 1986, Rosser paid his
deficiencies for 1982 and 1983.
On March 18, 1987, Rosser filed
timely refund claims for 1980 and 1981.
On April 1, 1987, Rosser filed refund
requests for 1979, 1982, and 1983. On
January 5, 1988, the IRS responded to
Rosser's refund claims by sending to
him via certified mail notices of disallowance for each of the years 1979
through 1983. Rosser denied receipt of
these notices and submitted an affidavit
attesting to his failure to receive them.
On December 30, 1988, Rosser
refiled his petitions for refunds for 1979
through 1983, contending that he had
not received the disallowance notices
from the IRS. The IRS responded by
mailing Rosser letters on January 17,
1989, which stated that it would look
into his 1982 and 1983 claims and answer him "more fully in 60 days." On
January 23, 1989, the IRS issued Rosser
a notice of disallowance for 1979, 1980,
and 1981. The notice explained that his
claims were not timely filed as required
by 26 U.S.C. Section 6511 and advised
Rosser to contact the IRS with questions.

On January 18, 1991, Rosser filed a
refund suit, arguing that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run upon
mailing of the initial notices of disallowance on January 5, 1988. Rosser
argued that the Section 6511 statute of
limitations should not begin to run until
the taxpayer actually receives the notice. Rosser contended that he reasonably relied on the January 17 and January 23, 1989, letters he received from
the IRS. In contrast, the IRS argued that
its letter mailed January 5, 1988, constituted adequate notice to begin the statute of limitations period, and that its
January 17, 1989, letter had no effect on
the limitations period.
The district court determined that
the statute of limitations did not bar
Rosser's suit, and pursuant to the parties' stipulation as to the relevant amount
in taxes, entered judgment in Rosser's
favor.
Eleventh Circuitrejects taxpayer's
argument that notice receipt is
required
On appeal, the IRS contended that
both the plain language of Section
6532(a)(1) and congressional intent
conflict with Rosser's interpretation of
the statute. Thus, the 11 th Circuit first
examined the language of Section
6532(a)(1) which states as follows:
[n]o suit or proceeding.. for the
recovery of any internal revenue
tax... shall be begun... after the
expiration of two years from the
date of mailing by certified mail
or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of
disallowance of the part of the
claim to which suit or proceeding
relates.
The court specifically noted that the
plain language of Section 6532(a)(1)
indicates that the statutory period begins to run from the date of the mailing,
irrespective of the taxpayer's receipt of
the notice.
The 11 th Circuit next scrutinized the
legislative history of Section 6532(a)(1),
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and determined that the purpose of the
statute was to eliminate uncertainty
about when the statute of limitations
begins to run in cases such as Rosser's.
The court reasoned that if the limitations period did not begin to run until
the taxpayer actually received notice,
the date triggering the limitations period would remain an uncertainty, and
thus inconsistent with Section
6532(a)(1)'s purpose.
Finally, the court observed the practical considerations of the two-year statute of limitations under Section
6532(a)(1). Requiring the IRS to prove
a taxpayer's actual receipt of a disallowance notice in order to trigger the
statute of limitations would be impractical. In addition, giving taxpayers the
opportunity to deny receipt of disallowance notices would further delay the
statute of limitations period.
IRS could assert limitations statute
The 11th Circuit also held that the
district court erred in relying on cases
applying equitable estoppel against the
federal government. The district court
found that the actions the IRS took on
Rosser' s refiled claims tolled the statute
of limitations, and that the January 23,
1989, notice of disallowance the IRS
sent Rosser in response to his refiled
claims "stated on its face without reservation or condition that plaintiff had
two years from [the date the second
notice was mailed] to file suit." The
11th Circuit, however, rejected the district court's conclusion. The appellate
court posited that the January 23, 1989,
notice contained no language which
could have led Rosser to believe that he
had two years from the date of this
notice to file his claim, nor did this
notice contain any other language which
could have misled Rosser. Finally, the
11th Circuit found no other bases for the
lower court to have employed the doctrine of equitable estoppel and, therefore, denied its application.
-Mona Dajani
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Texas Supreme
Court sets punitive
damages standards
In TransportationInsuranceCo. v.
Moriel, 1994 WL 246568 (Tex.), the
Supreme Court of Texas clarified standards governing the imposition of punitive damages awards in bad faith insurance cases. The court held that insurers
will be liable for punitive damages only
if bad faith is accompanied by gross
negligence. In addition, the court explained what a plaintiff must show to
establish gross negligence, and announced new procedural standards for
punitive damages awards. The court
required courts to separate the determination of the amount of punitive damages from the other issues at trial, and
mandated that courts of appeals which
review the factual sufficiency of punitive damages awards explain why the
evidence does or does not support the
award.
Insurance carrierdelays paying bills
In March 1986, Juan Moriel was
injured when a stack of countertops fell
on him. He sustained fractures of the
wrist, pelvis, and ribs. Transportation
Insurance Company (Transportation),
Moriel' s employer's workers' compensation carrier, paid his hospitalization
costs. Several days after his discharge
from the hospital, Moriel experienced
periods in which he was unable to move
his leg. He returned to the hospital for
testing. Six weeks following his accident, Moriel discovered he was impotent. After tests conducted in El Paso
revealed no physical cause for the impotence and hormone therapy failed to
cure the problem, doctors advised Moriel
to undergo additional testing at a Houston hospital. Doctors in Houston found
Moriel's impotence to be at least partially physical. They also recommended
that Moriel seek counseling for emotional problems. Moriel did so and even-

tually was able to resume sexual relations with his wife.
Transportation delayed paying four
of Moriel' s bills. The company received
a $3,155 bill for Moriel's Houston tests
in November 1986. Although Transportation had authorized the tests in
advance, it did not pay Moriel's bill for
more than two years, on the ground that
Moriel's impotence was unrelated to
his work injury. Second, Transportation delayed paying Moriel's $2,075
psychiatric counseling bill for more than
a year, claiming that it had never received the psychiatrist's report. Third,
the company delayed paying a $382.25
bill for outpatient testing. It paid only
after the hospital filed a collection action against Moriel. Finally, Transportation did not pay the bill for the El Paso
tests until after Moriel filed his lawsuit.
Evidence indicated, however, that because the El Paso company had mailed
the bill to the wrong address, Transportation did not receive it until after the
lawsuit commenced.
While he was undergoing testing and
treatment, Moriel filed a workers' compensation claim against Transportation.
In July 1987, he received an award of
$30,022.77 from the Industrial Accident Board. When Transportation appealed, Moriel counterclaimed for additional compensation, unpaid medical
bills, and bad faith claims practices. In
July 1988, Moriel and Transportation
settled the workers' compensation
claim.
At the trial on the bad faith claim, the
jury found that Transportation had no
reasonable basis to delay paying
Moriel's medical bills, and that Transportation had "acted with heedless and
reckless disregard" of Moriel's rights.
The jury awarded Moriel $1,000 in actual damages, $100,000 in mental anguish damages, and $1 million in punitive damages. The trial court entered
judgment on the verdict, and denied
Transportation's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur,

